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In all existing protocols of private communication with en-
cryption and decryption, the pre-shared key can be used for
only one time. We give a deterministic quantum key expan-
sion protocol where the pre-shared key can be recycled. Our
protocol costs less qubits and almost zero classical communi-
cation. Since the bit values of the expanded key is determin-
istic, this protocol can also be used for direct communication.
Our protocol includes the authentication steps therefore we
don’t worry about the case that Alice and Bob are completely
isolated.
I. INTRODUCTION
Information processing with quantum systems enables
us to do novel tasks which seem to be impossible with
its classical counterpart [1–3]. Among all of the non-
trivial quantum algorithms, quantum key distribution
(QKD) [3–9] is one of the most important and interest-
ing quantum information processing due to its relative
low technical overhead: the only thing required there
is quantum states preparing, transmission and measure-
ment. It needs neither quantum memory nor collective
quantum operation such as the controlled-NOT (CNOT)
gate. Therefore, QKD will be the first practical quan-
tum information processor [8]. QKD makes it possible
for two remote parties, Alice and Bob to make uncon-
ditionally secure communications: they first build up a
secure shared key and then use this key as the one-time-
pad to send the private message. However, in the stan-
dard BB84 [3] protocol, at least half of the transmitted
qubits are discarded due to the mismatch of preparation
bases and measurement bases to the qubits. Also, the
standard BB84 protocol does not include authentication.
This makes it insecure in the case that Alice and Bob are
completely isolated: Eavesdropper (Eve) may intercept
all classical information and quantum information and
the actual case there is that each of Alice and Bob are
doing QKD with Eve separately.
In this Letter, we shall give an efficient protocol to ex-
pand the key deterministically or make direct communi-
cation, with authentication being included. Our protocol
has the advantage of lower cost in both classical commu-
nication and quantum states transmission. Our protocol
includes the authentication steps. The pre-shared key
can be recycled in our protocol.
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The requirement of pre-sharing a secret string is not a
serious drawback of our protocol. In the case authenti-
cation is required for security, all protocols need a pre-
shared secret string; in the case that authentication is
thought to be unnecessary, our protocol need not pre-
share anything initially: they may first use any standard
QKD protocol to generate a secret random string and
then use this string as the pre-shared string.
The the initial version of QKD protocol [3] proposed
by Bennett and Brassard is fully efficient by delaying the
measurement. This delay requires the quantum memo-
ries which are very difficult technique. Another method
is to assign significantly different probabilities to the dif-
ferent bases [10]. Although unconditional security of the
scheme is given [10], it has a disadvantage that a larger
number of key must be generated at one time. Roughly
speaking, with the bases mismatch rate being set to ǫ,
the number of qubits it needs to generate at one time
is ǫ−2 times of that of the standard BB84 [3]. In a re-
cently proposed QKD protocol without public announce-
ment of basis (PAB) [11,12], there is no measurement
mismatch. However, the protocol in its present form has
the disadvantage that one must make many batches of
keys before any batch is used to encrypt and transmit
classical message. Note that they must abort the pre-
shared secret string after the key expansion. To really
have an advantage in the efficiency, one should generate
as many secret bits as possible at one time, by that proto-
col. Blindly generating too many secret bits at one time
means a higher cost: First, the complexity of decoding
the error correction code rises rapidly with the size of
the code. Second, the quantum channel could be expen-
sive. In practice, it could be the case that we don’t know
how many secret bits are needed in the future commu-
nication. For example, a detective is sent to his enemy
country Duba from the country VSA. He is scheduled to
work in Duba for only one month and then come back to
the headquarter in VSA. The so called secret bits will be
useless after that month.
The existing protocols for quantum direct communi-
cation can save some cost of classical communications.
Unfortunately, they are either insecure [18–20] or only
quasisecure [21]. Moreover, all of them require quantum
memory.
So far, it seems that our protocol is the unique one
which has the advantage of lower cost of both quantum
states transmission and classical communication while
still holding the unconditional security.
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II. OUR PROTOCOLS AND SECURITY PROOF
We shall use the reduction technique. We first re-
duce the classical protocol to quantum protocol (the one
uses perfect entangled pairs and quantum memories), and
then reduce the quantum protocol back to classical pro-
tocol (the one without any entangled pair or quantum
memory). We start with a trivial scheme, Protocol 1.
Protocol 1, Classical protocol
Alice and Bob share a secret key, i.e., g-bit random string,
G. Alice wants to send an N -bit classical binary string s
to Bob, g > N . She chooses first N bits from G and de-
notes this substring as b. She prepares an N -qubit string
q which is in the quantum state |b ⊕ s〉, and sends these
N qubits to Bob. Here ⊕ is the summation modulo 2.
Suppose the values of the ith element in string b and s are
bi and si, respectively, given any value of bi⊕ si, she just
prepares the ith quantum state |bi ⊕ si〉 accordingly. All
qubit states in q are prepared in Z basis. Bob measures
each of qubits in Z basis and obtain an N−bit classical
string, taking ⊕ operation of this string and string b he
obtains the message string. Alice and Bob discards string
b.
This is just classical private communication with one-
time-pad. Obviously, the message string s is perfectly
secure no matter how noisy the quantum channel is.
Though there are bit-flip errors in to the transmitted
message, there is no information leakage. In this proto-
col, the one-time-pad cannot be recycled. Since all qubits
are prepared in Z basis, Eve in principle can have full in-
formation of b⊕s without disturbing the quantum string
q at all. For the purpose of recycling the one-time-pad,
we reduce it to our Protocol 2, a quantum protocol. Lat-
ter on, we shall classicalize Protocol 2.
Protocol 2: Secure communication with recyclable quan-
tum one-time-pad.
Alice and Bob share g pairs of (exponentially) perfect en-
tangled pairs of |φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉). For convenience
we shall call this pair state as EPR pair. Alice wants
to send N -bit classical binary string s to Bob. Accord-
ing to each individual bit information, she prepares an
N−qubit quantum state |s〉, all of them being prepared
in Z basis. She chooses her halves of first N pairs from
g pairs and number them from 1 to N . We denote these
N pairs by E, Alice’s halves of E by EA, Bob’s halves of
E as EB . To each of the ith qubit in |s〉 and ith qubit in
EA, she takes CNOT operation with the ith qubit in EA
being the controlled qubit and the ith qubit in |s〉 as the
target qubit. i runs from 1 to N . She sends those N tar-
get qubits to Bob. Bob takes a CNOT operation to each
of the ith received qubit and the ith qubit of EB , with
the received qubit being the target qubit and the qubit in
EB being controlled qubit. Bob takes a measurement in
Z basis to each of the target qubit and obtain a classical
string. He uses this string as the message from Alice.
The message s in this protocol is as secure as that in
Protocol 1.
Proof. Imagine the case that Alice measures each qubits
in EA in Z basis in the beginning, then protocol 2 is
identical to Protocol 1. However, no one except Alice
knows whether she has taken the measurement. There-
fore she can choose not to measure her halves of entan-
gled pairs. This is just Protocol 2. In Protocol 2, N EPR
pairs have been used as a quantum shared key, however,
we don’t have to discard them after the message s has
been decrypted. Instead, Alice and Bob may do purifi-
cation to those N pairs, given the information of bit-flip
rate and phase-flip rate. After the purification, the out-
come pairs can be re-used as (almost) perfect entangled
pairs. So the next question is on how to do the pu-
rification efficiently. The bit-flip rate is defined as the
percentage of pairs which have been changed into state
|ψ+〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 + |10〉) or state |ψ−〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 − |10〉);
phase-flip rate is defined as the percentage of pairs which
have been changed into state |φ−〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 − |11〉) or
state |ψ−〉. Or mathematically, if we consider the Pauli
channel consisting of the following operations:
σx = (
0 1
1 0
), σy = (
0 −i
i 0
), σz = (
1 0
0 −1 ) (1)
the channel operation σx or σy causes a bit-flip, the chan-
nel operation σy or σz will cause a phase-flip. One direct
way to know the bit-flip rate and phase-flip rate is to let
Alice and Bob randomly take some samples of those pairs
and then measure the samples in Z ( {|0〉, |1〉})or in X
( {|±〉 = 12 (|0〉 ± |1〉}))basis in each side, and obtain the
statistical values of those flip rates for the remained pairs.
However, in testing the phase-flip rates with samples of
those used EPR pairs, the corresponding message bits
must be discarded because once the bit values of EPR
pairs are announced, Eve has a way to attack encrypted
message bits. Moreover, we want to reduce the proto-
col back to classical protocol therefore we don’t directly
sample the entangled pairs. We can have a better way for
the error test. Consider the initial state of an entangled
pair and the the quantum state of message bit |χA〉,
|h0〉 = |φ+〉 ⊗ |χA〉. (2)
In the most general case |χA〉 = α|0〉 + β|1〉 and |α|2 +
|β|2 = 1. In our protocol 2, there will be Alice’s CNOT
operation, transmission and Bob’s CNOT operation to
the message qubit. In transmission, the encrypted quan-
tum state of message bit could bear a flipping error of
σx, σz or σy. It is easy to see that, after Bob’s CNOT
operation, σx error of transmission channel will cause a
σx error to the the message qubit only, σz error of trans-
mission channel will cause a σz error to the EPR pair and
σz error to the message qubit, while σy error of transmis-
sion channel will cause a σz error to the EPR pair and a
σy error to the message qubit. That is to say, the final
state will be
|hf 〉 = |φ+〉 ⊗ (σx|χA〉) (3)
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given a σx flip to the encrypted message qubit in trans-
mission;
|hf 〉 = (σz |φ+〉)⊗ (σz |χA〉). (4)
given a σz flip to the encrypted qubit in transmission;
and
|hf 〉 = (σz |φ+〉)⊗ (σy |χA〉) (5)
given a σy flip to the encrypted qubit in transmission.
We now show eq.(4). The other two equations can be
shown in a similar way. Consider the initial state defined
by eq.(2). After the CNOT operation done by Alice, the
state is changed to
|h′0〉 =
1√
2
|00〉 ⊗ |χA〉+ 1√
2
|11〉 ⊗ (α|1〉+ β|0〉). (6)
Suppose there is a phase-flip to the encrypted qubit dur-
ing the transmission, the total state is then changed to
|h′′0〉 =
1√
2
|00〉 ⊗ (α|0〉 − β|1〉) + 1√
2
|11〉 ⊗ (−α|1〉+ β|0〉). (7)
After Bob take the CNOT operation, the final state is
changed to
|hf 〉 = |φ−〉 ⊗ |χA〉 = (σz |φ+〉)⊗ (σz |χA〉). (8)
This completes the proof. Although there could be phase-
flips to the transmitted qubits, as we have shown already,
in principle, there is no information leakage of the orig-
inal message. Threfore we disregard those phase-flips to
the message qubits. Note that the model of Pauli chan-
nel and classical statistics work perfectly here [13–15],
given arbitrary channel noise, including any type of col-
lective noise. Therefore if we know the bit-flip rate and
phase-flip rate of the channel, we can deduce exactly the
flipping rate of those used EPR pairs. Therefore we can
simply mix some of qubits (test qubits) in transmitting
the message qubits. We don’t do any CNOT operations
(quantum encryption or decryption) to those test qubits.
Half of the test qubits should be prepared in X basis
and half of the test qubits should be prepared in Z ba-
sis. All of the test qubits should be mixed randomly
with the message qubits. Bob needs to know the mea-
surement bases of each qubits so as not to destroy any
message qubits. Bob also needs to know which qubits are
for testing and the original state of each test qubits so as
to see the flip-rates of transmission. Therefore, besides
N EPR pairs, they must also share a classical string b′
for the information of bases, positions and bit values of
each test qubits. Suppose after reading the test qubits,
Bob finds the error rate to those test qubits in X bases is
t0. Then they may safely assume (t0+ δ)N phase-flips to
the used EPR pair. δ is a very small number. The prob-
ability that the phase-flip rate of those used EPR pairs
is larger than t0 + δ is exponentially small. As we have
shown earlier, there is not bit-flip error to the used en-
tangled pairs. Therefore they may purify the used pairs
by the standard purification protocol [13,16] which costs
onlyN ·H(t0+δ) pairs,H(x) = −x log2 x−(1−x) log2(x).
Since their purpose is to re-use those pairs securely for
private communication in the future instead of really re-
producing the perfect EPR pairs, they need not really
complete the full procedure of the purification. Instead,
as it has been shown in Ref [13], except Alice herself, no
one knows it if she measures all EPR pairs in Z bases in
the begining of the protocol. Therefore the CSS code can
be classicalized [13] if the purpose is for security of pri-
vate communication instead of the real entanglement pu-
rification . Consequently, the initially shared EPR pairs
before running the protocol can be replaced by a classi-
cal random string and after they run the protocol they
recycle the random string by a classical Hamming code
with the phase-error rate input being t0 + δ. Protocol 3
can help them to do quantum key expansion efficiently,
without any quantum memory or entanglement resource:
1. Alice and Bob pre-share a secret classical random
string G. They are sure that the bit-flip rate and phase-
flip rate of the physical channel are less than tx − δ
and tz − δ, respectively. (In quantum cryptography, the
knowledge of flipping rates of physical channel does not
guarantee the security in any sense.) They choose two
Hamming code Cx and Cz which can correct (tx + δ)M
bits and (tz + δ)M bits of error, respectively. We sup-
pose tx + δ < 11% and tz + δ < 11%. 2. Alice plans
to send N deterministic bits, string s to Bob. Alice and
Bob take an M−bit substring b, an M ′−bit substring b′,
a 200-bit substring c and a 200-bit substring d from G,
from left to right. Here M = N1−H(t+δ) . 3. Alice expands
the message string s to S by Hamming code Cx. Obvi-
ously, there are M bits in the expanded string S. She
encrypts the expanded string S with string b, i.e., she
prepares an M−qubit quantum state |Sq〉 = |S ⊕ b〉 in
Z basis. All these encrypted message qubits are placed
in order. She also produces rN = 2k test qubits and
mix them with those qubits in |Sq〉. The position, bit
value and preparation basis of each test qubits are de-
termined by substring b′. This requires substring b′ in-
cluding M ′ ==
(
M + 2k
2k
)
+4k bits. The bit values (0
or 1), position and bases (X or Z) of those test qubits
must be totally random, since b′ is random. After the
mixing, she has a quantum sequence q which contains
M + 2k qubits. 4. Alice transmits sequence q to Bob.
5. Bob reads b′. After receives sequence q from Alice, he
measures each of them in the correct bases. He then sep-
arates the test bits and message bits, with their original
positions in each string being recovered. Bob reads the
test bits and check the error rate (authentication). If he
finds the bit-flip rate tx0 > t or phase-flip rate tz0 > t on
the test bits, he sends substring c⊕d to Alice by classical
communication and abort the protocol with string c be-
ing deleted fromG. If he finds the bit-flip rate tx0 ≤ t and
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phase-flip rate tz0 ≤ t on the test bits, he sends substring
c to Alice by classical communication and continues the
protocol. 6. Bob deletes c from G. He decrypts the en-
crypted expanded message string by b and then decodes
it by Hamming code Cx and obtains the message string.
The probability that Bob’s decoded string is not identical
to the original message string s is exponentially close to
0. The key expansion part (or communication part) has
been completed now. 7. Alice reads the 200-bit classical
message from Bob. If it is not c, she aborts the protocol
with string c being deleted from G.(This is also authen-
tication.) If it is c, she deletes substring c from G and
carries out the next step. 8. Alice and Bob replace b by
the coset of b+ Cz as the recycled string.
Remark 1. Our cost of qubit-transmission is less than half
of that in BB84 protocol. Our cost of classical commu-
nication is almost zero. Remark 2. After the protocol,
string b′ and d can be re-used safely. In our protocol,
even Alice announces b′, d, Eve’s information about mes-
sage s is 0. Therefore the mutual information between s
and {b′, d} is I(s : {b′, d}) = 0. Therefore, if message s
is announced while {b′, d} is not announced, Eve’s infor-
mation about {b′, d} must be also 0. Consequently, Eve’s
information to {b′, d} must be zero after the protocol.
Remark 3. If we want to reduce the number of pre-shared
qubits, we can use fewer test bits, i.e., reduce the value
of r. In our protocol, the total qubits needed is r−1 times
of that of BB84 protocol. To avoid a too large key ex-
pansion at one time, we can choose to raise the value of
δ, given a small r.
III. EXISTING PROTOCOLS OF DIRECT
COMMUNICATION WITH QUBITS ARE
INSECURE.
Our protocol cannot be replaced by any existing direct
communication protocol [17–21] with quantum states.
The insecurity of existing direct communication protocols
have been pointed out already for the case of noisy chan-
nel [18,19]. Here we show that these protocols are not ex-
ponentially secure even with noiseless quantum channel.
We suppose that there are m test qubits and N message
qubits. Consider the best case that they find no error to
the test bits. Even in such a case, the message is still
polynomially insecure: Eve has non-negligible probabil-
ity to obtain a few bits information to the message. For
example, Eve just intercepts one qubit in transmission
and measures it in Z basis ({|0〉, |1〉}) and then resends
it to Bob. Suppose the physical channel itself is noise-
less. Obviously, There is a probability of N/(N + m)
that Bob finds no error to the test bits while Eve has
one bit information about the message. In particular,
in certain cases, 1 bit leakage of message is disastrous
[14]. Such type of direct private communication is inse-
cure even with noiseless quantum channel, since the zero
error of test bits only guarantees less than δ errors of
the message bits, it does not guarantee zero phse-flip of
the message bits. In principle, there is no way to ver-
ify zero phase-flip error of the untested bits by looking at
the test bits only. The insecurity of existing protocols is
due to the lack of privacy amplification step, which is the
main issue of the security of private communication. One
cannot directly append a privacy amplification step here
since this may change the message bits therefore destroy
the message. One of the non-trivial point of our proto-
col is that the transmitted message bits in our protocol is
unconditionally secure without any privacy amplification,
no matter how noisy the channel is. There we only need
to correct the bit-flip errors in the message. This does
not change the message itself.
IV. DISCUSSIONS
Our protocol can obviously be used for both key expan-
sion and direct communication. In the security proof, we
have used a pre-condition that Eve has zero information
to the preshared string G. However, strictly speaking,
this condition does not hold in our real protocol. First,
as we have argued that the pre-shared string can be gen-
erated by standard BB84 QKD protocol where Eve’s in-
formation to the shared key is exponentially close to 0
instead of strict 0. Second, Eve’s information to the re-
cycled string is also exponentially close to 0 rather than 0.
Eve’s exponentially small prior information is not a prob-
lem to the security of classical private communication.
However, here we have used quantum states to carry the
classical message, Eve may store her quantum informa-
tion about the pre-shared (or recycled) secret string and
directly attacks the decoded message or the updated key
finally. With the universality of quantum compossibility
[22], we know that Eve’s a exponentially small amount of
prior information about the pre-shared string or the recy-
cled string will only cause an exponentially small amount
of information about the private message or the updated
shared string. Therefore our protocol is unconditionally
secure in the real case that Eve has exponentially small
amount of information to the pre-shared key.
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